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SOVEREIGNTY AND FOOD SAFETY IN A NAFTA
CONTEXT
Paul Martin
First, the disclaimers. I am not a food safety expert. In Canada the stan-
dards for food safety are set by Health Canada, and the enforcement and in-
spection function is carried out by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I
work in the trade policy shop of Agriculture Canada, where I have had the
privilege of being involved in the negotiation of rules on sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, both in the NAFTA and more particularly in the WTO.
So, in keeping with my own area of knowledge, I would like to talk about the
issues of sovereignty in the context of how countries have agreed to approach
food safety regulation in the NAFTA and WTO-based trade regime.
The basic argument I want to make here today is that both the NAFTA
and the WTO were carefully drafted to respect the sovereign right and re-
sponsibility of governments to make regulatory decisions that ensure the
safety of the food supply of their citizens. However, both sets of rules do
constrain the decision making process in some ways. As much as these con-
straints ensure that measures enhance food safety, they do not reduce the
ability of governments to meet their objectives in this regard. More impor-
tantly, both WTO and NAFTA are parts of a much broader economic trend
of globalization, which has the potential to bring considerable market-based
pressure on governments to regulate food safety concerns in a coherent man-
ner.
First, let us define some terms. I will define sovereignty as the right to
decide on national objectives, and the ability to apply measures necessary to
achieve these objectives. In the food safety area, this means the freedom to
decide on an appropriate level of protection from food safety risks, and the
right to regulate as necessary to achieve that protection. This means that I
would not consider it an infringement of sovereignty if governments are con-
strained in their ability to apply capricious measures, or measures that are not
actually related to their stated objectives. Indeed preventing this kind of be-
haviour was one of the key objectives of negotiating the rules on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures in the NAFTA and the WTO.
* Paul Martin is the Acting Director of the Multilateral Trade Policy Division of Agri-
culture and Agri-Food Canada. He received both Bachelors and Masters degrees from the
University of Guelph in Ontario, Canada.
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I will define food safety as the protection of consumers from toxins, con-
taminants, or diseases in food products. This is important because a number
of current controversies that revolve around "consumer concerns with food
quality and safety" are not strictly concerned with food safety issues.
There is an interesting issue of sovereignty where one government im-
poses mandatory government-enforced trade measures to require that prod-
ucts produced in another government's sovereign jurisdiction conform with
certain farming practices or processing methods. And, in fact, this kind of
extra-territorial regulation has traditionally been constrained under the
NAFTA and the WTO. In a market economy, of course, consumers have the
right to demand any products they want. Within certain limits, governments
have a role to intervene as necessary to ensure that products actually have the
characteristics that they claim to have. However, interventions that are de-
signed strictly to address consumers' preferences or political choices are not
about food safety. For the remainder of this discussion, I will focus on the
rules surrounding food safety regulation, and their implication for national
sovereignty.
The negotiation of specific international trade rules covering SPS meas-
ures is a relatively recent idea. Under the GATT 1947, the whole of human
animal and plant life protection was covered in one rather cryptic exception
clause,' which allowed countries to take measures "necessary to protect hu-
man animal or plant life or health." As a practical matter, although anecdotes
from some of the older agricultural trade policy hands suggest that trade-
motivated SPS barriers were fairly commonplace, agricultural trade in gen-
eral was subject to so many special protective rules that the marginal impact
of such standards was relatively minor.
However, in the run-up to the Uruguay Round in 1986, there was a
growing realization that as traditional tools for the regulation of agricultural
trade declined, there would be increasing pressure on regulators to generate
new protective barriers for particularly powerful sectors. This awareness was
reflected in the Punta del Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round
Article XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of meas-
ures:
a) necessary to protect public morals;
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver....
[Vol. 24:369 1998
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of multilateral negotiations.2 There, for the first time, Ministers directed ne-
gotiators to develop an agreement that would minimize the adverse effects of
SPS barriers on trade.
While the Uruguay Round was going on, Canada and the United States
were involved in the negotiation of NAFTA. Although the NAFTA text actu-
ally predated the WTO in conclusion, many of the NAFTA concepts and
much of the NAFTA language was drawn from the WTO negotiating texts.
In both sets of negotiations, the basic tension was the same: it was well-
understood that health and safety standards and regulations were an impor-
tant potential area of abuse in the interests of economic protectionism; and
everyone recognized that democratically elected governments simply could
not forego the right to regulate as necessary to defend the health of their citi-
zens.
The result is set out in Article 712 of the NAFrA, and Article 2 of the
WTO agreement. Basically, governments are free to take measures necessary
to achieve a level of protection which they consider appropriate, but their
regulatory decisions must be based on sound science and an assessment of
risks, as reflected in international standards, recommendations, guidelines, or
other scientific work.
It is important to underline the distinctions made by the agreements be-
tween a level of risk protection over which countries have wide discretion,
risk mitigation measures which must be scientifically related to achieving the
appropriate level of risk protection, and those which must be no more oner-
ous than necessary to achieve the goal.
In the WTO Agreement, there is a further obligation that countries must
determine their level of risk protection in a particular situation in a way that
avoids creating unnecessary trade barriers through arbitrary distinctions. This
is evident in the WTO Article 5.5. This clause was designed to prevent
countries from creating trade barriers by setting impossibly strict tolerances
for products they wished to protect from international competition while ac-
cepting larger risks associated with other products. This is a relatively easy
thing to say, but it gets very difficult to put into practice in different specific
cases. The WTO SPS Committee has been working for some time to develop
guidelines for the practical implementation of the concept of consistency in
levels of protection. Progress had not been very fast, in keeping with the dif-
ficulty of the subject and the fact that this concept has been central to the first
couple of dispute settlement cases under the SPS Agreement.
2 One of the objectives of the agriculture negotiations was set out as: "minimizing the
adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on trade in
agriculture, taking into account the relevant international agreements."
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Article 5.5 was dealt with in the recent WTO Appellate Body decision on
E.U. hormones.3 The Appellate Body decision essentially found that the
standard of proof needed to find a country in violation of the consistency
obligation is quite high.4 As a result, countries will probably continue to re-
tain very wide latitude to decide their risk tolerances on a situation-by-
situation basis in the foreseeable future.
Within the general guidelines of risk mitigation measures which must be
scientifically related to the risk reduction objectives they seek to achieve,
both the NAFTA and the WTO essentially leave countries to make their own
food safety regulatory decisions. To summarize in one phrase, the outcome is
sovereignty to act as individual governments deem appropriate within a fairly
large box defined by sound science.
The agreements do give some guidance about the size and shape of that
box. Basically, both agreements leave it to the discretion of the importing
country to decide whether the state of scientific knowledge about a risk is
adequate. In the case of differing scientific opinions, the importing country
retains the right to determine, within reasonable limits, which opinion to
credit.
Although there is language in both agreements requiring countries to base
their measures on international standards recommendations and guidelines,
both leave the decision about whether a particular international standard
meets its appropriate level of protection to the regulating authority. Of
course, that decision is supposed to be based on a scientific judgment about
the level of protection achieved by the international standard and the risks
associated with a particular situation, and both agreements provide a vehicle
for exporters to question a government that does not base its measures on an
international standard. However, the final decision remains a sovereign
power of the importing country.
In addition, both agreements make it very clear that when the science is
ambiguous, governments can and should act preemptively where there is
reason to believe that there is a risk to human, animal, or plant life or health.
The corollary in WTO Article 5.7 and in NAFTA Article 715.4 is that if a
3 See E.C - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS481ABI
R (Jan. 16, 1998).
4 In the E.U. Hormones case, the Appellate Body developed a three-part test in relation
to consistency. In order to be a violation of Article 5.5, a country would have to impose its
own levels of protection in different situations, those levels of protection must exhibit arbitrary
or unjustified distinctions in different situations. Those distinctions must result in discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade. In the E.U. Hormones case, the Appellate Body found.
the last of these was not proven. Future cases will no doubt elaborate on what proof is actually
required to show violation of Article 5.5.
[Vol. 24.369 1998
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government is acting in the absence of science, it should do so on a tempo-
rary basis while the scientific uncertainty is being resolved, and then it
should act in a way consistent with the science.
Finally, and this is important to the next subject I want to mention, gov-
ernments are required under both agreements to recognize the "equivalence"
of foreign measures which demonstrably achieve the health protection objec-
tives which the importing country has established. Here, too, there is a sub-
stantial deference to sovereign decision making by the importing country. In
WTO Article 4, equivalence is to be recognized where "the exporting Mem-
ber objectively demonstrates to the importing Member" that its risk mitiga-
tion measures achieve the importer's level of protection. A similar provision
is found in NAFTA Article 714 2(b). In both cases, the importer ultimately
retains considerable discretion in deciding when the demonstration has been
made convincingly. It is not clear how a WTO panel would rule on whether a
measure had been objectively shown to work if an exporter ever challenged a
failure by an importer to recognize a measure as equivalent.
The principle of equivalence is becoming increasingly important because,
aside from the legal plane on which governments retain considerable sover-
eignty over food safety decisions, there is a more practical reality of how
food safety regulation is actually done in an increasingly globalized econ-
omy.
Particularly in Canada and the United States after NAFTA, there has been
a significant trend in larger and fewer food processing establishments making
specialized products for a global or at least a North American market. With
the removal of tariffs on processed food, companies with operations on both
sides of the Canada/U.S. border have increasingly rationalized production by
assigning North American product mandates to plants situated in one country
or the other. Contrary to the predictions of some Canadian nationalists at the
time of the Free Trade Agreement, a sizeable number of these plants are in
Canada, so rationalization has been accompanied by a huge increase in two-
5
way trade in agri-food products. As a practical matter, neither Canada nor
the United States is in any position to inspect the high volume of products
crossing the border. In any case, to do so is not the most effective way of
ensuring the food safety status of products. In the past several years, efforts
have focused on more efficient ways to deal with these volumes of trade, and
assure the safety of the food supply. The main innovation has been a focus on
processed-based food safety systems, whereby standards concentrate on how
5 According to Agri-Food Canada, Canadian agri-food exports to the United States were
$3.6 billion in 1989 and $10.3 billion in 1996. Imports for the same years were $4.3 billion
and $7.9 billion, respectively. Similar growth has occurred in Canadian trade with other coun-
tries over the same time frame.
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the product is processed, rather than on assessing the safety of the final prod-
uct at the end of the production line. Of course, if regulations are to focus on
what happens in a processing plant and the processing plant is in another
country's jurisdiction, some level of coordination between national inspec-
tion authorities is required. In general, this takes the form of mutual recogni-
tion of the equivalence of the systems in the two countries.
This situation continues to accord full sovereignty to the importing party,
which ultimately must be convinced that the system under which a product is
produced is adequate and reliably implemented. However, it puts a signifi-
cant market pressure on regulatory systems in both countries to evolve in
ways that are compatible. Essentially, food businesses that have been estab-
lished on one side of the international border or the other with a view to
serving both markets need to be able to secure the necessary food safety ap-
provals in both markets without fail, or the investment that has gone into
making North American scale plants in each country will be lost.
Fortunately, both Canada and the United States have long histories of
fairly compatible approaches to food safety regulation, and both are moving
in similar directions with more focus on Hazard Analysis Critical Control
Point (HACCP) plans at the plant level, and in the horticulture area, back to
the farm level. Both have been using their government resources in more of a
monitoring and audit role to ensure that the necessary process controls are
actually observed. This is both more resource-efficient and more effective in
terms of reliable food safety results than the old end-point product inspection
model. In order to allow plants to effectively meet standards in both coun-
tries, the specific requirements for HACCP programs in the countries need to
be broadly consistent, and the regulatory authorities in both countries must
be willing to recognize equivalence in situations where differences in some
of the details of manufacturing and control procedures do not have signifi-
cant food safety implications.
International trade rules leave governments free to act with full sover-
eignty within a very wide scope to pursue their national interests in assuring
food safety for their consumers. At the same time, international trade and
investment patterns are increasingly making it in the interests of both gov-
ernments and consumers to have food safety systems that work in ways that
are mutually consistent.
The bottom line is that governments do in fact retain sovereign control
over the level of food safety protection to which they aspire, and the ability
to regulate as necessary to achieve that level of protection. In fact, I would
argue that the increased focus on objective scientific assessment and control
of risks, which is implied by the new international rules, actually provide
consumers with greater certainty that their food is safe, compared to the
[Vol. 24:369 1998
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situation prior to the WTO and NATA agreements when one could never be
certain that regulations were actually based on an objective assessment of
food safety needs.
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